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APPLYING MICHIGAN V. SUMMERS TO 
OFF-PREMISES SEIZURES: THE “AS EARLY 
AS PRACTICABLE” STANDARD 
DAVID TORREBLANCA† 
INTRODUCTION 
Police officers are waiting outside of the house of a suspected 
drug dealer, preparing to execute a search warrant for drugs and 
firearms that the officers have probable cause to believe are in 
the home.  Just before the police approach the premises, they 
observe the suspected drug dealer leave his house and head to 
his car.  The police know that they may detain the occupant 
before he leaves his property, but they fear that their swift 
approach might cause the possibly armed suspect to retaliate, 
flee, or retreat to his house to destroy the drugs, or that other 
occupants of the home might react violently or dispose of the 
drugs.  Instead of rushing the suspect and endangering his and 
their safety, the police pull him over outside of the view of his 
home, detain him, and bring him back to the house. 
Before the police search his home, the occupant consents to a 
search of his person.  The search of the occupant yields a gun and 
ten grams of methamphetamine.  The officers then search his 
house, but find no other contraband.  The occupant was 
apparently attempting to sell the methamphetamine, but was 
interrupted when the police detained him.  The police are not 
worried, however, since the occupant’s possession of over five 
grams of methamphetamine carries a mandatory sentence of at 
least five years in prison and four years of supervised release.1 
Fortunately for the suspect, and unfortunately for his 
community, he goes to trial in a district court in the Tenth 
Circuit.  The judge rules that the police illegally arrested the 
 
† Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2013, St. John’s University 
School of Law; B.A., 2009, Providence College. 
1 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii) (2012). 
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suspect when they detained him, since he had already left his 
premises.2  The judge acknowledges that the police could have 
seized the suspect while he was still on his property without 
violating his Fourth Amendment rights,3 but holds that the 
suspect’s off-premises detention was impermissible.4  
Consequently, the judge rules that the methamphetamine and 
gun the officers obtained from their unconstitutional seizure and 
search of the suspect are “fruit of the poisonous tree” and cannot 
be used as evidence against the suspect.5  If the officers had 
rushed to detain the suspect before he drove away from his 
property, risking their and the suspect’s safety and chancing the 
destruction of the drugs, the seizure would have been reasonable 
and the evidence obtained from the suspect would have been 
admissible.6  Since the officers waited until the occupant left his 
premises before detaining him, however, the detainment is an 
illegal arrest,7 the contraband is inadmissible in evidence,8 and 
the drug dealer likely goes free. 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”9  It protects an individual’s 
property, including his person, against a “seizure”: a “meaningful 
interference with an individual’s possessory interests in [his or 
her] property.”10  A person is seized when an officer, “by means of 
physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains his 
freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.”11 
 
2 See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 93–94 (10th Cir. 1996). 
3 See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (“Thus, for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, we hold that a warrant to search for contraband founded on 
probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the 
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” (footnote omitted)). 
4 See, e.g., Edwards, 103 F.3d at 93–94. 
5 See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963) (holding 
that evidence obtained as a direct consequence of an illegal arrest must be 
suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree”). 
6 See Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 (ruling that the occupant’s arrest and the 
search incident thereto were constitutionally permissible since it was lawful for 
police to detain the occupant while they executed a search warrant on his property). 
7 See, e.g., Edwards, 103 F.3d at 94. 
8 See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. 
9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
10 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
11 Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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Reasonable seizures, those supported by adequate cause, are 
constitutionally permissible, since officers must seize an 
individual “unreasonabl[y]” to violate his or her Fourth 
Amendment rights.12  In the case of an arrest, which is one form 
of “seizure” of a person, police need “probable cause.”13  Where an 
arrest is made in a home, police usually need an arrest warrant 
in addition to probable cause.14 
There are some situations, however, where police may seize 
a person incident to other circumstances with less than probable 
cause.  For example, in Michigan v. Summers,15 the Supreme 
Court held that a warrant to search for contraband on premises 
carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of 
those premises while the warrant is executed.16  The Court found 
that the police seized the occupant by detaining him while he was 
on his front steps, but ruled that the seizure was reasonable and 
did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.17  Since Summers, 
however, the circuits have split on whether police may detain an 
occupant of premises subject to a search warrant when the 
occupant leaves the premises immediately before the warrant is 
executed.18 
This Note argues that the correct standard for determining 
whether the off-premises seizure of an occupant of property 
subject to a search is reasonable is whether the police detained 
the occupant as soon as practicable.  Unlike the Eighth and 
Tenth Circuits, which have ruled that the Summers holding does 
not apply after the occupant leaves the premises,19 this Note 
contends that drawing a bright line at the residence’s curb serves 
no practical purpose and creates more problems than it prevents.  
Rather, this Note asserts that the same policies that guided the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Summers are at stake even after an 
occupant leaves his or her premises and that Summers should 
apply when officers detain the occupant as soon as practicable 
 
12 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting against “unreasonable” seizures). 
13 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959). 
14 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980). 
15 Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981). 
16 Id. at 705. 
17 Id. at 694, 696, 705. 
18 See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 2011) (discussing 
the circuit split), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013). 
19 See United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 94 (10th Cir. 1996); United States 
v. Sherrill, 27 F.3d 344, 346 (8th Cir. 1994). 
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after observing the occupant leave his property.  Further, this 
Note proposes three factors for courts to consider in evaluating 
whether police detained the occupant as soon as practicable: the 
distance the occupant traveled prior to his seizure, the time that 
elapsed between his departure and his detention, and evidence 
that police exploited the seizure. 
Part I provides an overview of the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, first 
discussing general Fourth Amendment principles, then analyzing 
the Supreme Court’s Summers decision.  Part II addresses the 
circuit split over extending Summers where the occupant of the 
premises has left the property.  Part II discusses the approaches 
taken by the four circuits that have applied, and the two circuits 
that have declined to apply, Summers to off-premises 
detainments.  Part III argues that the circuits that have 
extended Summers where officers have detained occupants off 
premises are correct.  It asserts that such detainments are 
reasonable seizures so long as the officers detained the occupants 
as soon as practicable after observing the occupants leave the 
property, and it provides guidelines for applying this test.  Part 
III further contends that the policies underlying the Fourth 
Amendment and the Summers decision support that result.  
Finally, Part IV addresses the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
rejecting the “as soon as practicable” standard and articulates 
why the Court’s approach falls short and needs to be revisited. 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S BAN AGAINST UNREASONABLE 
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
This Part discusses the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  Part I.A provides a 
brief overview of the government abuses that the Fourth 
Amendment was enacted to prevent and addresses how the 
Supreme Court has applied the Fourth Amendment in different 
contexts.  Part II.B delves into the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Michigan v. Summers, analyzing the policies and interests that 
guided the Court in holding that a search warrant carries with it 
the authority to detain the occupants of the premises being 
searched. 
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A. The Fourth Amendment’s Varied Standards of Protection 
The framers of the Constitution adopted the Fourth 
Amendment, in large part, to combat the government’s issuance 
of “writs of assistance” and “general warrants,” devices that 
empowered law enforcement to arbitrarily search and seize 
people and property.20  The Fourth Amendment restricts, rather 
than abolishes, the power of law enforcement to search and seize 
by condemning only “unreasonable” searches and seizures.21  The 
Amendment, which consists of two clauses, does not require a 
warrant for every search or seizure.22  Instead, it requires that 
warrants be issued only upon probable cause.23  Therefore, a 
search or seizure may be reasonable and constitutional without a 
warrant, but “writs of assistance” and “general warrants” are 
still prohibited by the requirement that a warrant be supported 
by probable cause.24 
The extent to which the Fourth Amendment protects people 
and property against arbitrary searches and seizures varies 
depending on the circumstances.  Officers must establish 
probable cause before a court issues a warrant:  Probable cause 
exists when the facts and circumstances within an officer’s 
personal knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of 
reasonable caution to believe that, in the case of a search, a 
particularly described item subject to seizure will be found in the 
place to be searched, and in the case of an arrest, an offense has 
been committed by the person to be arrested.25  However, a 
warrant may not be required.  While the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Fourth Amendment to generally require not just 
probable cause, but a search warrant, to validate the search of a 
 
20 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–26 (1886). General warrants 
“authorized searches in any place, for any thing.” Id. at 641 (Miller, J., concurring). 
Writs of assistance were issued on executive authority and gave extensive power to 
the King’s agents to search at will for smuggled goods. United States v. Chadwick, 
433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977). 
21 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 641. 
22 The first clause of the Fourth Amendment states that “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,” and the second declares 
that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
23 Id. 
24 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 641. 
25 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949). 
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home,26 police may search an automobile with probable cause 
alone.27  Similarly, a seizure in a home that amounts to an arrest 
requires an arrest warrant supported by probable cause,28 while 
an arrest in public requires probable cause, but not an arrest 
warrant.29 
Although the official seizure of a person generally must be 
supported by probable cause even where no formal arrest is 
made,30 there are also situations where police need neither a 
warrant nor probable cause before they may seize an individual.  
For instance, in Terry v. Ohio,31 the Supreme Court ruled that 
reasonable suspicion that an individual has committed or is 
about to commit a crime justifies a limited investigatory search 
and seizure, but not an arrest, of that individual, despite a lack of 
probable cause.32  “Reasonable suspicion” is a lower standard 
than probable cause, and requires “a minimal level of objective 
justification for making [a] stop.”33  Additionally, police do not 
need probable cause or a warrant to seize the occupant of 
premises that are subject to a search warrant.34 
B. Michigan v. Summers: Seizures Justified by Search Warrants 
In Michigan v. Summers, the Supreme Court established a 
bright-line rule that “for Fourth Amendment purposes, . . . a 
warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause 
implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the 
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.”35  
In Summers, police officers were preparing to execute a search 
warrant for narcotics on the defendant’s premises when the 
 
26 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“Any assumption that 
evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a 
search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would 
reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people’s homes secure only in the 
discretion of police officers.”). 
27 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982) (holding that a search 
warrant is not required for police to search an automobile where the search is based 
on probable cause). 
28 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980). 
29 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959). 
30 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 211 n.14, 212 (1979). 
31 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
32 Id. at 20–22. 
33 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). 
34 Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981). 
35 Id. (citations omitted). 
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defendant started to descend his front steps.36  The police 
requested the defendant’s assistance in entering the house and 
detained him while they searched it.37  After the officers found 
narcotics in the home, they arrested the defendant, searched his 
person, and found an additional 8.5 grams of heroin on him.38  
The defendant, charged with possession of the heroin found on 
his person, moved to suppress the heroin as a product of an 
illegal search in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.39  The 
trial court suppressed the evidence, and both the Michigan Court 
of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed.40  The 
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that it was 
lawful for the police to seize the defendant and require him to re-
enter his home and remain there until they gathered evidence 
that established probable cause.41  Accordingly, once probable 
cause to arrest the defendant was established, his arrest and the 
search that followed it were constitutionally permitted.42 
The Summers Court based its decision on the limited 
intrusiveness of the seizure and the important law enforcement 
interests at stake in such a case.43  The Court first addressed the 
seizure’s limited invasiveness, concluding that the defendant’s 
detention was “substantially less intrusive” than an arrest.44  The 
Court stressed that the police had obtained a warrant to search 
the defendant’s house for contraband.45  A neutral and detached 
magistrate determined that there was probable cause to believe 
that a crime was being committed in the house and authorized 
the police to substantially invade the privacy of the people 
residing there.46  The Court remarked that “[t]he detention of one 
of the residents while the premises were searched, although 
 
36 Id. at 693. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 694. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 705–06. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 699 (stating that some “seizures admittedly covered by the Fourth 
Amendment constitute such limited intrusions on the personal security of those 
detained and are justified by such substantial law enforcement interests that they 
may be made on less than probable cause, so long as police have an articulable basis 
for suspecting criminal activity”). 
44 Id. at 702 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979)). 
45 Id. at 701. 
46 Id. 
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admittedly a significant restraint on his liberty, was surely less 
intrusive than the search itself.”47  The Court further stated that 
most citizens would choose to remain at their homes to observe 
the search of their possessions unless they wished to flee to avoid 
arrest.48  Additionally, the Court noted that the type of detention 
involved was unlikely to be exploited or excessively prolonged by 
police since the information that police seek would ordinarily be 
obtained by the search of the premises, not the seizure of the 
occupant.49  Finally, the Court stated that the detention of the 
occupant in his home “could add only minimally to the public 
stigma associated with the search itself and would involve 
neither the inconvenience nor the indignity associated with a 
compelled visit to the police station.”50 
The Court next cited four substantial law enforcement 
interests that justify detaining an occupant during the execution 
of a search warrant.  The first and most obvious concern is 
preventing the occupant’s flight if incriminating evidence is 
discovered.51  Keeping the occupant close by could allow for an 
easy arrest without the need for a chase, provided that the search 
establishes probable cause.52  The second and more important 
interest is in minimizing the risk of harm to the occupants and 
the police.53  The Court noted that the facts in Summers revealed 
no particular danger to the police, but stated nonetheless that 
police can reduce the risk of harm to all involved by “routinely 
exercis[ing] unquestioned command of the situation.”54  An 
officer’s command of the situation can diminish the threat of 
harm especially in the case of a search for narcotics—the type of 
situation that is conducive to sudden violence.55  The third 
interest identified by the Court concerns an occupant’s panicked 
efforts to hide or destroy evidence;56 detaining the occupant 
during the search will prevent him from concealing or destroying 
 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 702. 
51 Id. 
52 See id. 
53 Id. at 702–03. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 702. 
56 Id. 
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evidence.57  The final police interest that justifies the seizure of 
an individual incident to a search of his home is the facilitation of 
the search.58  The police have an interest in completing the 
search quickly, and the occupant has an interest in preventing 
the destruction of his property by opening doors and containers.59  
Given the important police interests at stake and the minimal 
“incremental intrusion” on the occupant’s personal liberty 
involved, the occupant’s connection to the home subject to a 
search “gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain 
basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies 
a detention of that occupant.”60 
II. THE CIRCUITS’ APPLICATIONS OF SUMMERS TO OFF-PREMISES 
DETENTIONS 
This Part addresses the circuit split over extending Michigan 
v. Summers to off-premises seizures.  Part II.A discusses the 
balancing approach taken by the Eighth and Tenth Circuits in 
refusing to apply Summers where the occupant has left the 
premises and the benefits and drawbacks of their approach.  Part 
II.B analyzes the “as soon as practicable” standard used by the 
Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits in extending Summers 
to off-premises detainments.  Part II.B also discusses the 
arguments for and against that standard. 
A. The Eighth and Tenth Circuits’ Balancing Approach 
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have declined to extend 
Michigan v. Summers, which held that a search warrant for 
premises allows the police to detain the occupants of the property 
during a search,61 where the occupants of the premises have left 
the property.62  Those courts held that Summers was inapplicable 
because the law enforcement interests that justified the 
Summers holding are not at stake after an occupant departs from 
his property.63  In United States v. Edwards, the Tenth Circuit 
 
57 See id. 
58 Id. at 703. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 703–04. 
61 Id. at 705. 
62 United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 94 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Sherrill, 27 F.3d 344, 346 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Thus, we decline the Government’s 
invitation to extend Summers to the circumstances of this case.”). 
63 Edwards, 103 F.3d at 93–94; Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346. 
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opined that “the police’s legitimate law enforcement interest in 
preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence was 
found was far more attenuated than in Summers,”64 and that 
neither the interest in minimizing the risk of harm to officers nor 
that of facilitating the orderly completion of the search “were 
served in any way by [the defendant’s] extended detention.”65  As 
such, the Tenth Circuit held that the defendant’s seizure three 
blocks from his home was an illegal arrest.66 
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Sherrill, 
held that “when the officers stopped [the defendant], the officers 
had no interest in preventing flight or minimizing the search’s 
risk.”67  That the defendant helped the officers conduct the 
search, one of the interests cited by the Summers Court, did not 
persuade the Sherrill court to find the detention permissible.68 
The Sherrill court gave an additional justification for not 
applying Summers, ruling that the intrusiveness of an officer’s 
detention of an occupant rises dramatically after the occupant 
leaves the premises.69  In Sherrill, immediately before they 
executed the search warrant, the police saw the defendant drive 
away from his home.70  They stopped him just one block away, 
and after the police detained him, he helped the police enter and 
conduct the search of his home.71  The court distinguished 
Summers, stating that although the minor intrusiveness involved 
in detaining an occupant in his home may be outweighed by law 
enforcement interests, the situation changes after the occupant 
leaves his property.72  Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit held that 
where the occupant has departed from his premises, the 
combination of the greater intrusion on his rights and the 
reduced importance of law enforcement interests changes a 
would-be reasonable seizure under Summers to an unreasonable 
one.73 
 
64 Edwards, 103 F.3d at 93–94. 
65 Id. at 94. 
66 Id. at 93–94. 
67 Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. (“Here, because Sherrill had already exited the premises, the 
intrusiveness of the officers’ stop and detention on the street was much greater.”). 
70 Id. at 345. 
71 Id. at 345–46. 
72 See id. at 346. 
73 See id. 
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The Eighth and Tenth Circuits used a balancing test in 
determining that the off-premises seizure of an occupant was 
unreasonable.  The courts weighed the police interests outlined 
by the Summers Court—preventing flight, minimizing the risk of 
harm to officers and occupants, avoiding the concealment or 
destruction of evidence, and facilitating the orderly completion of 
the search74—and determined that absent the occupants’ 
knowledge that their premises were going to be searched, the 
officers’ seizures of the occupants were unreasonable.75  The 
courts reasoned that an occupant learns of the search and 
becomes a risk when police execute a warrant in the occupant’s 
presence, but if he is off the property, he will not know of the 
search and thus the situation will not implicate any law 
enforcement concerns.76  The “intrusiveness of detaining a 
resident in his home” cannot be “outweighed by . . . law 
enforcement interests” if there are no law enforcement interests 
to balance against intrusiveness.77  Accordingly, the balance can 
only be shifted where the occupant knows beforehand that his 
property is subject to a search warrant.78  Because this situation 
is unlikely to arise,79 the Eighth and Tenth Circuits’ approach to 
Summers detentions will effectively render Summers 
inapplicable where the occupant is detained off premises. 
The balancing approach of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits 
carries a number of benefits.  First, it gives broader Fourth 
Amendment protection.80  Since the Fourth Amendment 
guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
 
74 Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702–03 (1981). 
75 United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 94 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Unlike the 
defendant in Summers, who was present where the search warrant was executed, 
Edwards did not know—prior to being stopped—that any warrant was being 
executed. He thus had no reason to flee.”); Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346 (holding that the 
law enforcement interests at stake in Summers were irrelevant in the present case 
“because Sherrill had left the area of the search and was unaware of the warrant”). 
76 See Edwards, 103 F.3d at 94; Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346. 
77 See Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346. 
78 See Edwards, 103 F.3d at 93–94; Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346. 
79 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.21 (West 2013) (“A search warrant shall be 
issued with all practicable secrecy, and the complaint, affidavit or testimony upon 
which it is based shall not be filed with the clerk or made public in any way until the 
search warrant is executed.”); In re United States, 10 F.3d 931, 941 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(noting that “those subject to an arrest or search warrant have notice at the time the 
intrusion occurs,” not before). 
80 See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
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houses, papers, and effects,”81 broad rights under the 
Amendment protect a citizen’s own interests.  Second, it gives 
police a bright-line rule to follow.  Officers would know “that the 
authority to detain under Summers always dissipates once the 
occupant of the residence [leaves].”82  Third, the balancing 
approach appears to comport with the reasoning of the Summers 
Court by refusing to extend Summers where its justifications do 
not seem to apply.83 
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits’ balancing approach has 
many disadvantages, however.  First, if the occupant of the 
premises knows of the impending search, the police are unlikely 
to be aware of his knowledge.  Where an occupant in fact knows 
of the warrant and is a flight risk, or will hide, destroy, or sell the 
evidence of his crime, police will lose the evidence if the occupant 
leaves the premises with it.  Even where the occupant does not 
know of the search warrant, but he leaves his property to sell it, 
police would be kept from detaining the occupant and preventing 
the loss of the evidence.84  Second, because the balancing test 
turns on whether the occupant is aware of the warrant, police 
might be encouraged to investigate to find whether the occupant 
knows of the warrant.  This investigation could lead to the kind 
of dangers that Summers tried to combat, like a sudden outburst 
of violence by an occupant who becomes aware that he is being 
followed by police.85  Third, drawing a bright line at the premises’ 
curb would put officers in a difficult position:  When police 
witness an occupant “leaving a residence for which they have a 
search warrant, they would be required either to detain him 
immediately (risking officer safety and the destruction of 
evidence) or to permit him to leave the scene (risking the 
inability to detain him if incriminating evidence was 
 
81 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
82 United States v. Bailey, 468 F. Supp. 2d 373, 379 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 652 
F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013). 
83 Edwards, 103 F.3d at 94; Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346; see James A. Adams, 
Search and Seizure as Seen by Supreme Court Justices: Are They Serious or Is This 
Just Judicial Humor?, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 413, 444 (1993) (suggesting that 
the dangers warned of in Summers may be “hypothetical and unrealistic” in some 
cases); Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 227, 271 (1984). 
84 See, e.g., Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 345–46 (“When the police conducted a search of 
Sherrill at the station, they discovered 92.71 grams of crack in his underwear and 
$740 on his person.”). 
85 Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981). 
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discovered).”86  Fourth, requiring police to rush to detain the 
occupant on the premises, even where police have reason to 
believe that other occupants within the premises pose a risk of 
destroying the evidence, would place any evidence that is still on 
the property at risk.87  Finally, the Summers Court itself held 
that although not all four of the law enforcement interests that it 
cited were present in Summers, the importance of those 
interests, even if they did not arise in the facts of a particular 
case, justified the Court’s holding.88  According to the Court’s 
decision, it should not matter whether the occupants are actually 
aware of the search warrant.89 
B. The Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits’ “As Soon As 
Practicable” Standard 
The Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits use an “as 
soon as practicable” standard in extending Summers to off-
premises detainments.90  The standard, as stated by the Second 
Circuit, is that “Summers imposes upon police a duty based on 
both geographic and temporal proximity; police must identify an 
individual in the process of leaving the premises subject to search 
and detain him as soon as practicable during the execution of the 
search.”91  There is no balancing of the Summers interests under 
 
86 United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2011). 
87 See United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 55 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The police could 
assume that once alerted, the occupants might have disposed of the contraband by 
the window or the toilet . . . .”). 
88 See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 (“Although no special danger to the police is 
suggested by the evidence in this record, the execution of a warrant to search for 
narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic 
efforts to conceal or destroy evidence.”); Adams, supra note 83. 
89 See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 (noting the interests of preventing flight and 
“minimizing the risk of harm to the officers”). 
90 See Bailey, 652 F.3d at 206 (applying Summers where police detained the 
defendant “as soon as practicable”); United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1011 
(7th Cir. 2011) (holding that police “had the authority to detain Bullock during 
execution of the search warrant; he was the subject of the officers’ investigation, had 
just left the premises, [and] was pulled over as soon as reasonably practicable”); 
United States v. Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying Summers to an 
off-premises seizure and holding that “[t]he proximity between an occupant of a 
residence and the residence itself may be relevant in deciding whether to apply 
Summers, but it is by no means controlling”); United States v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 
337, 339 (6th Cir. 1991) (ruling that the focus under Summers “is upon police 
performance, that is, whether the police detained defendant as soon as practicable 
after departing from his residence”). 
91 Bailey, 652 F.3d at 206. 
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this test because the courts assume that those interests are what 
permit the seizure of the occupant.92  Instead, if police see the 
occupant leaving his premises, they may detain him so long as 
they do so as early as practicable.93 
In each case within this group, the courts held that the off-
premises seizure of an occupant was reasonable where the police 
had a search warrant for the occupant’s premises and the police 
witnessed the occupant leave the premises.94  The officers 
stopped each occupant as early as practicable.95  In United States 
v. Bailey, for example, police were outside the defendant’s home, 
preparing to execute a search warrant that they had obtained 
just over an hour earlier.96  The police watched the defendant get 
into a car, but decided not to confront the defendant “within view 
or earshot of the apartment.”97  Instead, the officers followed the 
defendant’s car and pulled him over approximately one mile 
away from his home.98  The officers explained that they did not 
seize the defendant immediately because of “safety concerns, 
particularly the desire to avoid alerting other individuals who 
may have been in the apartment to the presence of law 
enforcement.”99  Additionally, the officers stated that they waited 
until the defendant drove about a mile before stopping him to 
prevent other occupants or neighbors from seeing the stop and to 
conduct the stop past an intersection and off of a crowded 
street.100  The court held that the defendant’s seizure one mile 
from his home was constitutional under Summers.101 
Similarly, in United States v. Cochran, the Sixth Circuit held 
that the police’s seizure of the defendant after the defendant had 
driven a short distance away from his house was reasonable.102  
 
92 See, e.g., id. at 205. 
93 See, e.g., id. at 206. 
94 See id. at 205; Bullock, 632 F.3d at 1007–08; Cavazos, 288 F.3d at 711; 
Cochran, 939 F.2d at 339. 
95 Bailey, 652 F.3d at 207; Bullock, 632 F.3d at 1011; Cavazos, 288 F.3d at 711; 
Cochran, 939 F.2d at 339. 
96 Bailey, 652 F.3d at 200. The police obtained a search warrant at 8:45 PM on 
July 28, 2005, went to the premises, watched the defendant leave the property at 
about 9:56 that same evening, and stopped him approximately five minutes later. Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 200 n.3. 
99 Id. at 200 n.2. 
100 Id. at 200 n.3. 
101 Id. at 199. 
102 United States v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 338 (6th Cir. 1991). 
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The court held that “police performance” was the relevant 
inquiry, not whether the defendant was on or off his premises at 
the time the police detained him.103  However, the court stated 
that “this performance-based duty will normally, but not 
necessarily, result in detention of an individual in close proximity 
to his residence.”104 
In United States v. Bullock, the Seventh Circuit stressed the 
policies behind the Summers decision in ruling that the police’s 
stop of the defendant, an occupant of the house to be searched 
along with the defendant’s children ten to fifteen blocks from the 
residence, was reasonable since the car was “pulled over as soon 
as reasonably practicable.”105  The court ruled that when the 
officers informed the defendant of the warrant, he became a 
flight risk and a threat to the police’s safety in executing the 
warrant.106  “The detention of [the] occupant [was] warranted 
‘because the character of the additional intrusion caused by 
detention [was] slight and because the justifications for detention 
[were] substantial.’ ”107 
Finally, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Cavazos, stated 
that the defendant’s seizure two blocks away from his residence 
was permissible because his “behavior immediately before the 
detention and his connection to the house—as either occupant or 
resident—provided the agents with ample justification to detain 
him during the search.”108  Prior to the police executing the 
search warrant, the defendant left the house in a truck, drove 
toward the officers watching the residence, and peered inside the 
officers’ vehicle.109  The police attempted to follow the defendant, 
but the defendant turned his truck around so that “the two 
vehicles were approaching” one another.110  Then, the truck 
“crossed over into the officers’ lane, creating a sort of stand off,” 
and the officers exited with guns drawn and detained the 
 
103 Id. at 339 (holding that defendant’s attempt to distinguish Summers because 
police stopped the Summers defendant while he was coming down his front steps, 
while officers detained Cochran after he had left his property, was without merit). 
104 Id. 
105 United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1009, 1011 (7th Cir. 2011). 
106 Id. at 1020. 
107 Id. at 1018 (quoting Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005)). 
108 United States v. Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 2002). 
109 Id. at 708. 
110 Id. 
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defendant.111  The court noted that the proximity of the occupant 
to his residence may be relevant, but it is not controlling.112  
Seizing the occupant of the premises to be searched as early as 
practicable and bringing him back to the residence does not 
violate the occupant’s Fourth Amendment rights.113 
The “as soon as practicable” standard of the Second, Fifth, 
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits has numerous advantages in 
protecting the interests, outlined in Summers, of preventing the 
occupant’s flight, minimizing the risk of harm to officers and 
occupants, avoiding the destruction of evidence, and facilitating 
an orderly search.114  First, this approach prevents the loss of 
evidence by allowing the police to detain occupants who do or do 
not exhibit any knowledge of a warrant, but nonetheless have 
evidence on them that may be sold or discarded absent police 
detaining the occupant.115  Second, because officers may detain 
the occupant even though the occupant is initially unaware of the 
warrant, officers will not feel inclined to investigate the occupant 
before detaining him and thereby risk arousing suspicion.116  
Avoiding alerting the occupant to the search or surveillance can 
allow the police to keep the situation from turning violent,117 
reduce the chance of the occupant fleeing,118 and prevent the 
destruction of evidence.  Third, allowing the police to detain the 
occupant off premises prevents other occupants from seeing the 
police.119  Alerting other occupants to law enforcement presence 
again raises the risks of police safety, flight, and destruction or 
 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 712. 
113 See id. at 711. 
114 Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702–03 (1981). 
115 See, e.g., United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1007 (7th Cir. 2011). After 
police arrested the defendant based on probable cause established during the search 
of his premises, they searched the defendant’s person and found an additional 
“sixteen individually wrapped baggies of crack cocaine.” Id. at 1010. Had police not 
detained the defendant off-premises pursuant to the search, the defendant may have 
sold the drugs. See id. 
116 See, e.g., Cavazos, 288 F.3d at 708. The defendant appeared to be aware that 
police were conducting surveillance on him or his home, which led to a tense 
situation where the officers and the defendant had a “stand off” and the officers 
drew their weapons. Id. 
117 See, e.g., id. 
118 See Alschuler, supra note 83, at 270. 
119 See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 200 n.2 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 
133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013). 
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concealment of evidence.120  Fourth, the “as soon as practicable” 
standard provides police an opportunity to wait until they can 
carry out the seizure of an occupant with minimal safety risks.121  
Fifth, allowing the police to detain the occupant even after he 
leaves the premises will facilitate the orderly completion of the 
search and prevent unnecessary property damage.122  Sixth, the 
occupant’s presence during the search, whether he was initially 
seized on or off the premises, can protect the police from 
unknown dangers like guard dogs that police would encounter 
while conducting their search.123  Finally, given the Summers 
Court’s holding that the facts in each case do not have to 
implicate every law enforcement interest for the detainment of 
an occupant of premises to be reasonable,124 these courts’ 
approach of not investigating whether every interest was in fact 
at stake is consistent with Summers.125 
There are, however, disadvantages to the “as soon as 
practicable” standard.  For one, allowing police to detain the 
occupant of premises subject to a search warrant after the 
occupant leaves the premises seems to be more intrusive on 
Fourth Amendment rights than an on-premises detainment.126  
Second, there is the possibility that police will “manipulate[] the 
circumstances surrounding the execution of the search warrant 
for defendant’s residence in order to create an opportunity to 
search” the defendant or his vehicle.127  Finally, if the interests  
 
 
120 See United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 55 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The police could 
assume that once alerted, the occupants might have disposed of the contraband by 
the window or the toilet, or might have precipitated violence.”). 
121 See Bailey, 652 F.3d at 200 nn.2–3. The court found that “[t]he officers’ 
decision to wait until Bailey had driven out of view of the house to detain him out of 
concern for their own safety . . . was, in the circumstances presented, reasonable and 
prudent.” Id. at 206. 
122 See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703 (1981). Even the Eighth Circuit, 
which declined to extend Summers to off-premises detentions, acknowledged that 
such seizures can help officers conduct a search. See, e.g., United States v. Sherrill, 
27 F.3d 344, 346 (8th Cir. 1994). 
123 See United States v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 338 (6th Cir. 1991). 
124 See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 (finding the detention of the occupant 
reasonable “[a]lthough no special danger to the police [was] suggested by the 
evidence in [the] record”). 
125 See Bailey, 652 F.3d at 205. 
126 Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346. 
127 See Cochran, 939 F.2d at 338. The Cochran court, however, found that the 
police did not manipulate the search warrant for the defendant’s home to create an 
opportunity to search the defendant’s car. Id. at 339. 
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justifying the Summers decision are truly irrelevant in a 
particular case, any detention under Summers would be 
unjust.128 
III. EXTENDING SUMMERS TO OFF-PREMISES DETENTIONS 
This Part asserts that the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh 
Circuits’ “as soon as practicable” standard, which extends 
Summers where police detain an occupant as soon as practicable 
after his departure from the premises, is the proper test, but 
proposes more explicit guidance in applying it.  Part III.A 
suggests three factors that courts should look to in determining 
whether police seized the occupant as early as practicable.  Part 
III.B contends that the policies underlying the Fourth 
Amendment support extending Summers to off-premises 
seizures.  Part III.C asserts that the Summers holding and 
rationale justify the “as soon as practicable” standard.  Part 
III.C.1 argues that an off-premises seizure, like the on-premises 
seizure in Summers, is limited in its intrusiveness, and Part 
III.C.2 maintains that the police interests cited by the Summers 
Court are equally applicable to off-premises detainments. 
A. Factors in the “As Soon As Practicable” Evaluation 
The circuit courts that applied the “as soon as practicable” 
standard used the correct test for determining whether an off-
premises Summers detention is constitutionally permissible, but 
failed to adequately advise police and trial courts of what to look 
for in evaluating the propriety of such a seizure.  The courts 
could have better ensured that off-premises detentions would be 
minimally intrusive by explicitly declaring factors that would 
weigh for or against a finding that police detained an occupant as 
soon as practicable.  These factors, implicit in the courts’ 
opinions, include the distance the occupant traveled before police 
seized him, the time that elapsed before officers detained him, 
and evidence that police manipulated the circumstances to 
exploit the seizure. 
 
 
 
128 See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 93–94 (10th Cir. 1996); 
Adams, supra note 83; Alschuler, supra note 83. 
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Courts should look to the distance the occupant traveled 
prior to her detention.129  The nearer an occupant is to his home 
when police detain his, the more likely a court will find that 
police detained his as soon as practicable.130  While a few blocks 
is acceptable,131 and a mile is permissible when police are 
concerned about public safety,132 it is unlikely that a court would 
find police detaining an occupant twenty miles from her home 
constitutionally tolerable.133 
Courts should also consider the time that passed between 
the occupant leaving his premises and the police seizing him.134  
A court will be more willing to hold that officers seized the 
occupant as soon as practicable when they do not excessively 
delay his detention.135  Police waiting five minutes before pulling 
over the occupant is reasonable,136 but delaying an hour will 
almost certainly be impermissible.137 
Finally, courts should determine whether officers 
manipulated the circumstances surrounding the seizure to 
exploit it for illegitimate purposes.138  A court will more likely 
find that police detained an occupant as soon as practicable if 
there is no evidence that the officers exploited the detention.139  
For instance, a detention will probably violate the Fourth 
Amendment if police delay detaining the occupant only so they 
can use the seizure as a springboard to search the defendant and  
 
 
 
129 See Bailey, 652 F.3d at 206; Cochran, 939 F.2d at 339; 1 JOSEPH G. COOK, 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 3:8 (3d ed. 2011). 
130 See Cochran, 939 F.2d at 339 (noting that detaining an occupant as soon as 
practicable “will normally, but not necessarily, result in detention of an individual in 
close proximity to his residence”); JOHN M. BURKOFF, SEARCH WARRANT LAW 
DESKBOOK § 13:2 (2012). 
131 See, e.g., United States v. Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 2002). 
132 See Bailey, 652 F.3d at 200 n.3. 
133 See Cochran, 939 F.2d at 339. 
134 See Bailey, 652 F.3d at 206. 
135 See id. (stating that “Summers imposes upon police a duty based 
on . . . temporal proximity”). 
136 See id. at 200. 
137 See id. at 206 (noting that police have a “duty based on . . . temporal 
proximity” and must detain occupants “as soon as practicable”). 
138 See Cochran, 939 F.2d at 338–40 (analyzing whether it was the defendant’s 
actions or the police’s actions that led to defendant’s detention). 
139 See id. at 339. 
FINAL_TORREBLANCA 2/27/2014  6:31 PM 
782 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:763   
his car.140  Additionally, a seizure will likely be unreasonable 
when officers attempt to embarrass the occupant by detaining 
him only after he comes into wide public view.141 
B. Fourth Amendment Policies 
The extension of Summers to allow an off-premises seizure of 
an occupant whose premises are subject to search does not raise 
the concern of the Fourth Amendment’s ban on “general 
warrants.”  A “general warrant, in which the name of the person 
to be arrested was left blank . . . perpetuated the oppressive 
practice of allowing the police to arrest . . . on suspicion.”142  In 
Summers, the Supreme Court held that the detainment of an 
occupant of premises that are being searched is constitutional in 
part because of the existence of a search warrant, founded on 
probable cause, for the premises.143  The Court found that 
because the determination of probable cause to search is made by 
a neutral and detached magistrate, “[t]he connection of an 
occupant to [the home to be searched] gives the police officer an 
easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that 
suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention of that 
occupant.”144  Therefore, a proper Summers detainment, in which 
the police detain the occupant of premises subject to a valid 
search warrant, does not raise the dangers of “general warrants.”  
Officers are not given unlimited discretion to arrest who they 
please, based on mere suspicion, but are given the “limited 
authority” to detain the occupant of the premises while they 
conduct a search.145  Whether the occupant of the premises is 
detained on or off the premises while the search is conducted is 
irrelevant, because it is his “connection” to the premises for 
which there is probable cause to search that allows the police to 
detain him.146  Accordingly, the police detaining an occupant as 
soon as practicable after they witness him leaving his property 
does not implicate the issue of the Fourth Amendment’s  
 
 
140 See id. 
141 See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981) (citing the seizure’s 
minimal “public stigma” as support that its intrusiveness is limited). 
142 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959). 
143 Summers, 452 U.S. at 703. 
144 Id. at 703–04. 
145 Id. at 705. 
146 See id. at 703–04; COOK, supra note 129. 
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protection against “general warrants” since the police are still 
basing their seizure of the occupant on his connection to his 
premises.147 
C. Summers’ Policies 
1. The Seizure’s Limited Intrusiveness 
Of key importance to the Summers Court was the limited 
intrusiveness of the seizure involved in detaining an occupant of 
premises that are being searched.148  The Court stated that the 
seizure was “surely less intrusive than the search itself.”149  This 
reasoning applies equally when the defendant has already 
departed the premises.150  The Summers Court ruled that the fact 
that the defendant was leaving his premises when he was 
detained was not of constitutional significance.151  “The seizure of 
respondent on the sidewalk outside was no more intrusive than 
the detention of those residents of the house whom the police 
found inside.”152  The Court found that the location of the 
occupant at the time of seizure does not matter since the 
invasiveness of the search will still outweigh that of the 
seizure.153  Therefore, the intrusion on an occupant’s liberty when 
he is detained off premises is still less than the invasion involved 
in the search itself.154 
Additionally, the Summers Court stated that, in contrast to a 
custodial interrogation and arrest, the seizure of an occupant of 
premises during a police search is “ ‘substantially less 
intrusive.’ ”155  Such a seizure, whether on the premises or off, is 
the same—police detain the occupant on his premises while they 
 
147 See United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1019 (7th Cir. 2011); BURKOFF, 
supra note 130. 
148 See Summers, 452 U.S. at 701–02. 
149 Id. at 701. 
150 United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 
1031 (2013) (“The guiding principle behind the requirement of reasonableness for 
detention in such circumstances is the de minimis intrusion characterized by a brief 
detention in order to protect the interests of law enforcement in the safety of the 
officers and the preservation of evidence.”). 
151 Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 n.16. 
152 Id. 
153 See id. 
154 See id. 
155 Id. at 702 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979)). 
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conduct their search.156  Accordingly, the same reasoning applies 
to on-premises and off-premises seizures.  Like the on-premises 
seizure in Summers, an off-premises seizure is not likely to be 
exploited or prolonged since the information that police seek will 
probably be obtained through the search of the premises and not 
the seizure of the occupant.157  Police are still forbidden from 
searching the occupant until independent probable cause is 
established.158  Further, no matter where the initial seizure takes 
place, because the detention is in the occupant’s own home, “it 
could add only minimally to the public stigma associated with the 
search itself and would involve neither the inconvenience nor the 
indignity associated with a compelled visit to the police 
station.”159  Additionally, evidence that police exploited the off-
premises detention would weigh against a court finding that 
police detained the occupant as early as practicable, and the 
seizure would likely be invalid for failing the “as soon as 
practicable” standard.160  The intrusiveness of a valid off-
premises Summers detention is still far less than that of an 
arrest and custodial interrogation. 
2. The Law Enforcement Interests’ Continuing Relevance 
The four substantial law enforcement interests that justified 
the Summers Court’s holding—preventing flight in the event that 
police find incriminating evidence, minimizing the risk of harm 
to police and occupants, averting the hiding or destruction of 
evidence, and enabling the efficient completion of the search161—
remain important regardless of where the occupant is first 
seized.162  “While the Eighth and Tenth circuits apparently 
concluded that once an occupant leaves a premises subject to 
search without knowledge of the warrant, Summers is 
 
156 See, e.g., id. at 701; United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1019 (7th Cir. 
2011) (holding that because the defendant “was detained for thirty or forty minutes 
at a residence he had just left and had visited on multiple occasions,” the police’s 
“interests in detaining him during the search were not outweighed by [the] rather 
limited intrusion on his freedom”). 
157 See Summers, 452 U.S. at 701; COOK, supra note 129 (stating that courts 
have disapproved of interrogations conducted during Summers detentions). 
158 See Summers, 452 U.S. at 705. 
159 Id. at 702. 
160 See supra notes 139–41 and accompanying text. 
161 Summers, 452 U.S. at 702–03. 
162 See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 
S. Ct. 1031 (2013). 
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inapplicable because” the law enforcement interests no longer 
apply; “it is the very interests at stake in Summers that permit 
detention of an occupant nearby, but outside, of the premises.”163  
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits’ balancing approach to off-
premises detainments would force police into a Hobson’s choice of 
electing to either rush in to detain the occupant before he leaves 
the premises, endangering the officers’ safety and risking the 
destruction of the evidence, or allow the occupant to leave the 
scene, forfeiting the ability to detain the occupant if 
incriminating evidence is found.164  Allowing officers to detain the 
occupant “as soon as practicable” provides them with the ability 
to “ ‘exercise unquestioned command of the situation’ ” at the 
moment when the Summers Court recognizes that “they most 
need it.”165 
The “as soon as practicable” approach furthers the first law 
enforcement interest stated by the Summers Court: preventing 
flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found.166  The 
“as soon as practicable” standard, unlike the Eighth and Tenth 
Circuits’ balancing approach, does not require that the occupant 
have knowledge of the warrant before police may constitutionally 
seize him.167  Therefore, courts applying the “as soon as 
practicable” standard avoid the risk of alerting the occupant that 
he is being followed or investigated because police may detain the 
occupant without having to discover whether he knows of the 
warrant.168  Police are permitted to detain the occupant before 
they arouse his suspicions, preventing him from becoming a 
flight risk.169 
The “as soon as practicable” standard protects the Summers 
Court’s second policy interest underlying its holding: minimizing 
the risk of harm to officers and occupants.170  First, because police 
do not have to explore whether the occupant has knowledge of 
the warrant and do not risk alerting the occupant of their 
 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 205–06. 
165 See id. (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 703); BURKOFF, supra note 130. 
166 Summers, 452 U.S. at 702. 
167 See Bailey, 652 F.3d at 205. 
168 See id. 
169 See United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1014 (7th Cir. 2011) (stating 
that the government has a “strong interest in detaining Bullock to prevent flight 
while they conducted their search”); Alschuler, supra note 83, at 270. 
170 Summers, 452 U.S. at 702–03. 
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presence,171 officers are less likely to cause the occupant to erupt 
violently.172  Second, officers can avoid alerting other occupants of 
their presence by detaining the occupant away from the 
premises.173  It is reasonable to assume that seizing an occupant 
outside of his home might risk the officers’ safety.174  Similarly, 
the police’s ability to wait until it is practicable before detaining 
the occupant allows them to better protect the public from harm 
by stopping and seizing the occupant in a low-traffic area.175  
Finally, police detaining and bringing back the occupant before 
conducting the search shields the police from unknown dangers, 
such as guard dogs.176 
The “as soon as practicable” standard aids police in 
preventing the concealment, loss, or destruction of evidence, the 
third interest cited by the Summers Court.177  Unlike under the 
balancing approach, police may prevent the loss of evidence by 
detaining occupants who do or do not demonstrate awareness of a 
warrant, but who are carrying evidence that they can sell or 
discard.178  The police are better able to prevent the loss of 
evidence by detaining the occupant before he is able to dispose of 
it in some way.179  Similarly, since police may detain the occupant 
after he leaves the premises, they can avoid alerting other 
occupants of the residence that police have an interest in the 
premises.180  This protects law enforcement interests by 
preventing the other occupants’ destruction or concealment of the 
evidence.181 
The “as early as practicable” approach advances the final law 
enforcement interest identified by the Summers Court: 
facilitating the orderly completion of the search of the 
 
171 See Bailey, 652 F.3d at 205. 
172 See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 (stating that “the execution of a warrant to 
search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden 
violence”). 
173 Bailey, 652 F.3d at 200 n.2. 
174 Id. at 206; see United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 55 (2d Cir. 2000). 
175 See Bailey, 652 F.3d at 200 n.3. 
176 See United States v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 338 (6th Cir. 1991). 
177 Summers, 452 U.S. at 702. 
178 See, e.g., United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1007–08, 1011 (7th Cir. 
2011). 
179 See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702; BURKOFF, supra note 130. 
180 Bailey, 652 F.3d at 200 n.2. 
181 See id. at 206; United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 55 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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premises.182  Officers detaining the occupant and returning him 
to his home will help police complete the search smoothly and 
efficiently, minimizing the unnecessary destruction of property.183  
The occupant has a self-interest in opening locked doors and 
containers.184  This holds true regardless of where the occupant is 
first seized.185 
VI. THE SUPREME COURT’S INADEQUATE SOLUTION IN BAILEY V. 
UNITED STATES 
This Part addresses the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Bailey v. United States.186  Part IV.A discusses the Court’s 
rejection of the “as soon as practicable” standard in favor of a 
rule grounded in the “immediate vicinity” of the premises being 
searched.  Part IV.B asserts that the Supreme Court’s new 
standard is flawed and proposes that the issue be revisited. 
A. The Bailey v. United States Holding 
In early 2013, the Supreme Court, in a six to three decision, 
rejected the Second Circuit’s application of the “as soon as 
practicable” standard.187  The Court instead adopted a test that 
permits Summers detentions only when they occur within the 
“immediate vicinity” of the property being searched.188  The Court 
discussed several factors to decide whether police detained an 
occupant within the “immediate vicinity” of his home, “including 
the lawful limits of the premises, whether the occupant was 
within the line of sight of his dwelling, the ease of reentry from 
the occupant’s location, and other relevant factors.”189 
The Supreme Court declined to extend Summers to off-
premises seizures because it found that such seizures do not 
implicate the law enforcement interests underlying the Summers 
 
182 Summers, 452 U.S. at 702–03. 
183 Id. at 703; see COOK, supra note 129. 
184 Summers, 452 U.S. at 703. 
185 See, e.g., United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir. 2011); 
United States v. Sherrill, 27 F.3d 344, 346 (8th Cir. 1994). 
186 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013). 
187 Id. at 1042. 
188 Id. at 1041 (“The categorical authority to detain incident to the execution of a 
search warrant must be limited to the immediate vicinity of the premises to be 
searched.”). 
189 Id. at 1042. 
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decision.190  First, the Court stated that the concern of 
minimizing the risk of harm to the officers conducting the search 
is not triggered because the occupant ceases to pose a risk when 
he leaves the property.191  Second, the Court dismissed the 
interest in the suspect facilitating the search since, under the 
facts of the case, the suspect was unwilling to cooperate and the 
search had been completed by the time he was brought back to 
his apartment.192  Third, the Court stated that the law 
enforcement interest in preventing flight when police find 
incriminating evidence is not raised by off-premises suspects 
because these suspects do not jeopardize the “integrity of the 
search.”193  In sum, the Court refused to apply Summers because 
it found the justifications underpinning the rule lacking in off-
premises detentions.194 
B. Bailey v. United States Should Be Revisited 
The “immediate vicinity” rule that the Supreme Court 
articulated in Bailey invites uncertainty into Summers detention 
cases.  Additionally, the Court’s rationale fails to account for 
serious law enforcement concerns.  Accordingly, the Court should 
revisit its Bailey holding. 
In Bailey, the Court attempted to establish a simple rule 
that defines when Summers detentions are permissible:  Seizures 
are tolerable if they occur within the “immediate vicinity” of the 
property to be searched.195  However, the factors delineated by 
the Court—“the lawful limits of the premises, whether the 
occupant was within the line of sight of his dwelling, [and] the 
ease of reentry from the occupant’s location”196—will not 
consistently provide a logical answer to whether a seizure was 
permissible.  For instance, if a suspect whose home is about to be 
searched steps off of his property and reaches the street before 
being seized, will the detention be valid?  The answer would seem 
 
190 Id. at 1041 (“In sum, of the three law enforcement interests identified to 
justify the detention in Summers, none applies with the same or similar force to the 
detention of recent occupants beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises to be 
searched.”). 
191 Id. at 1038–39. 
192 Id. at 1040. 
193 Id. at 1040–41. 
194 Id. at 1041. 
195 See id. at 1042. 
196 Id. 
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to be yes, even though the occupant left his property, because he 
likely still has a line of sight to the property and could easily 
reenter it.  On the other hand, what about a suspect who lives in 
an apartment building and enters the stairwell next to his room 
before police seize him?  Even though he would probably be closer 
to the premises than the other suspect and would therefore pose 
a greater danger to police, his seizure would likely be found 
impermissible; he was off of his property and did not have a line 
of sight to it. 
The three-prong “as soon as practicable” standard that this 
Note proposes197 would not carry the same shortfall of illogical 
application.  Under this Note’s test, both of the seizures described 
above would be permissible, provided that police witnessed the 
suspect leaving the premises.  Both detentions would satisfy the 
prongs of the “as soon as practicable” standard:  The occupants 
were seized (1) near their property, (2) shortly after their 
detention, and (3) the circumstances surrounding the seizures 
were not manipulated by the police.198  Rather than treating 
similar circumstances differently, as the Court’s new Bailey 
analysis would, this Note’s approach would yield consistent 
results across parallel circumstances. 
In addition to the “immediate vicinity” rule’s problems, the 
Bailey Court unduly downplayed the significance of the Summers 
interests for off-premises seizures.199  First, the interest in 
minimizing the risk of harm to police does not disappear when 
the occupant leaves the premises.  For example, “the police do not 
know whether an emerging individual has seen an officer.  If he 
has, . . . those inside may learn of imminent police entry and fire 
the gun.”200  Second, the concern of facilitating the orderly 
completion of the search is the same regardless of where police 
detain the occupant.201  Third, the interest in preventing flight 
“will be present in all Summers detentions” since “any occupant 
departing a residence containing contraband will have incentive 
to flee once he encounters police.”202  It is naïve to contend that  
 
 
197 See supra Part III.A. 
198 See supra Part III.A. 
199 Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1046–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see supra Part III.C.2. 
200 Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1048; see supra Part III.C.2. 
201 Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1047; see supra Part III.C.2. 
202 Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1046–47; see supra Part III.C.2. 
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the law enforcement interests supporting the Summers doctrine 
dissipate when the suspect leaves the immediate vicinity of his 
home.  As Justice Breyer forcefully reasoned: 
Consider why the officers here waited until the occupants had 
left the block to stop them:  They did so because the occupants 
might have been armed. 
Indeed, even if those emerging occupants were not armed (and 
even if the police knew it), those emerging occupants might 
have seen the officers outside the house.  And they might have 
alerted others inside the house where, as we now know (and the 
officers had probable cause to believe), there was a gun lying on 
the floor in plain view.  Suppose those inside the house, once 
alerted, had tried to flee with the evidence.  Suppose they had 
destroyed the evidence.  Suppose that one of them had picked 
up the gun and fired when the officers entered.  Suppose that an 
individual inside the house (perhaps under the influence of 
drugs) had grabbed the gun and begun to fire through the 
window, endangering police, neighbors, or families passing 
by.203 
Because of the dangers to the community that the Court’s 
test invites, Bailey will likely not be the end of this story. 
CONCLUSION 
Rather than using a balancing approach in determining 
whether the seizure of the occupant of premises subject to a 
search warrant is reasonable after the occupant leaves the 
premises, the Michigan v. Summers holding should be extended 
so long as police detained the occupant “as early as practicable” 
after seeing the occupant leave the premises.  Factors courts 
should look to in applying the “as early as practicable” standard 
are the proximity between the occupant’s home and his place of 
seizure, the amount of time that elapsed between the occupant’s 
departure and his detention, and whether police exploited the 
seizure.  Off-premises, compared to on-premises, detainments of 
occupants pose no substantial additional intrusion on their 
Fourth Amendment rights.  Additionally, the law enforcement 
interests underlying the Summers holding of preventing flight, 
protecting police safety, avoiding the concealment or destruction 
of evidence, and facilitating the search justify the application of 
Summers where an occupant has left the premises and the police 
 
203 Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1047–48 (citations omitted). 
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detained him as early as practicable.  Police detention of an 
occupant during the execution of a search warrant is surely 
justified where the defendant is “the subject of the officers’ 
investigation, ha[s] just left the premises, [is] pulled over as soon 
as reasonably practicable, and . . . [is] a flight risk and pose[s] a 
potential danger to the officers conducting the search.”204  The 
defendant’s detention is “warranted because the additional 
intrusion caused by detention [is] slight and the justifications 
[are] substantial.”205 
 
 
204 United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1011 (2011). 
205 Id. 
